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INTRODUCTION

Federal legislative responses to national drug crises in the
United States have historically taken a criminal justice ap1
proach to addressing problem drug use. This criminal justice
approach emphasizes the use of punishment administered by
* J.D., Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Law, Elon University. Thank you to
Leo Beletsky, Alex Kreit, Jennifer Oliva, Kelly Dineen, &John Cook for helping me brainstorm and workshop early drafts of this article. Sincerest thanks
to Jennifer Carroll, Patricia Perkins, and David Levine for their insight and
comments throughout the drafting and editing process. A special thanks to
Victoria Corey, Emily B. Chatzky and Clancy Phillips for their invaluable assistance with the research for this article. Finally, a thank to you to NYU's
Classical Liberal Institute, its Center of Civil Justice, and the NYU Journal of
Law & Business for hosting their conference "The Opioid Conference," and
inviting me to present my work.
1. Although at times the criminal justice and punitive approach may
seem interchangeable, the criminal justice approach, by my definition, also
includes proposals to administer drug treatment through the criminal jus317
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criminal justice agencies.2 Given this focus, few policymakers
question why criminal justice agencies like the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") and its grandfather,3 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics ("FBN"), were deemed the "fixers" of the
drug problem.4 The DEA, a federal agency within the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), was seen so much so as the fixer of
problem drug use that it was tasked by Congress to not only
oversee the control over the illicit drug supply, but also with
oversight over important aspects of the production, distribution, and availability of licit, pharmaceutical substances that
are deemed potentially addictive. 5
In addressing the opioid crisis,6 Congress has explicitly
questioned its historic reliance on a criminal justice approach

tice system. Some may consider such mandatory treatment punitive, while
others may argue that it is still a health solution.
2. SeeJoseph F. Spillane, The Road to the HarrisonNarcotics Act: Drugs and
Their Control, 1875-1918, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF
PoICY AND PRACTICE 1, 7-8 Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds.,
Pharm. Prods. Press 2004) (discussing how the leader of the Narcotics Bureau utilized emotionally-charged narratives so that legislators would believe
that those suffering from addiction were deviant persons requiring punishment as the only means to control drug use); see also Joseph F. Spillane,
Building a Drug Control Regime, 1919-1930, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE
EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE

25, 25-61 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F.

Spillane eds., Pharm. Prods. Press 2004) (discussing how marginalized
groups were targeted in the 19th century as deserving punishment); see generally EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR PouTics: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 151-76
(1996); DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA (enl. ed. 2001) (1982).
3. MATTHEW R. PEMBLETON, CONTAINING ADDICTION: THE FEDERAL BuREAU OF NARCOTICS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS

(2017). The FBN also laid down the "global footprint" that would later be
the domain of the DEA. Id. at 52, 200, 238, 271.
4. Fixers hold a position of power and are consulted by legislators to fix
social problems prior to proposing legislative solutions. Consequently, fixers
receive large shares of federal and state funding. See generally DEBORAH
STONE, PoLcY PARAnox: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 224 (3d

ed. 2012).
5. See 21 U.S.C.

§§ 811-32 (2018).

6. The opioid crisis refers to both the high number of opioid overdose
deaths and the quadrupling of opioid overdoses since 1998. Rose A. Rudd et
al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths - United States,
2010-2015, 65 MoRBlDTY & MORTALITY WKLv. REP. 1445, 1445-52 (Dec. 30,

2016).
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to problem drug use 7 and has instead adopted a more healthoriented approach. 8 In the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 ("CARA"),9 the initial federal legislation enacted as a response to the current opioid crisis, Congress
stated the following: "It is the sense of the Congress that decades of experience and research have demonstrated that a
fiscally responsible approach to addressing the opioid abuse
epidemic and other substance abuse epidemics requires treating such epidemics as a public health emergency emphasizing
prevention, treatment, and recovery." 1 0
Despite this legislative rhetoric, the DEA, a criminal justice agency," continues to retain the power to make key decisions on the classification of potentially-addictive substances,
thereby affecting their manufacture, distribution, and overall
availability.1 2 While the DEA is statutorily required to defer to
7. Arrests for nonviolent drug-related offenses have been a key compo-

nent of the criminal justice approach to drug use. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 required the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to report on the collateral consequences of nonviolent drugrelated offenses. Congress requested the report to include information regarding the effects of these consequences on affected persons who try to
resume their professional and personal activities. Congress also requested
that the report include an explanation of how these consequences remain
justifiable. Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-198, § 401 (130 Stat. 695) 723-24 (2016).
8. See Taleed El-Sabawi, Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure
Groups, and Problem Definition, 48 U. MEM. L. REv. 1357, 1359-64 (2018).

9. Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-198 (130 Stat. 695) (2016).
10. Id. § 708.
11. Part of the mission of the DEA "is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal
and civil justice system of the United States ... those organizations and principal members ... involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances . . . for illicit traffic in the United States." DEA Mission
Statement, U.S. DRUG ENF'T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/mission (last vis-

ited Aug. 14, 2019).
12. Namely, under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, the DEA has
the power to schedule a substance, an act which can result in manufacturing
quotas, limitations on dispensing, import restrictions and criminal penalties
for the unlawful distribution or manufacture of these substances. 21 U.S.C.
§ 811 et seq. (2018). The number of restrictions placed on a substance coincide with the schedule the drug is placed on. The number of schedules
range from I-V with schedule I having the greatest restrictions. Theoretically, drugs placed on schedule I have the greatest likelihood for abuse, although "abuse" is not expressly defined in the Act itself, and the scientific
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the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),'s a public health
agency,1 4 at junctions of the decision-making process,' 5 the
current "split enforcement" 6 scheme laid out in the statutes' 7
has not actualized the legislative intent of balancing the medical and scientific considerations with those of law enforcement, tilting the weight of determinations instead to law enforcement criteria and a criminal justice approach to its regulation and enforcement.1 8 The current shift in legislative
basis for substances' classifications can be tenuous at times. See GERALD F.
UEhlMEN & VirOR
G. HADDOx, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAw SOURCEBOOK
§ 1:10 (West 2003). While these controlled substances are deemed to have a
potential for abuse, many of them also have therapeutic or medical benefits.
Under current laws, had these substances not had potential for abuse, they
would have been regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as
pharmaceutical drugs or food supplements. See, e.g., id. §§ 3:39, 3:104.
13. The statutory mandate requires the DEA to confer with the Health
and Human Services (HHS). The FDA is part of HHS and the Secretary of
HHS has delegated the authority to consult with the DEA on issues of scheduling to the FDA. Lars Noah, Challenges in the FederalRegulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31J.L., MED. & ETHics 55, 60 (2003); 21 U.S.C. § 811(b)

(2000).
14. See Oxycontin and Beyond: Examining the Role of FDA and DEA in Regulating PrescriptionPainkillers:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs of the
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 21 (2005) [hereinafter Oxycontin and
Beyond] (statement of Robert Meyer, Director, Office of Drug Evaluation II,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration).
15. For example, Congress has made it clear that the DEA must refer to
the Secretary of the Department of HHS for recommendations when scheduling potentially-addictive substances. The Secretary of the Department of
HHS operates through the FDA's Center for Drugs and with advice from the
FDA Drug Abuse Advisory Committee. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b). Furthermore, the
FDA has the veto power over the scheduling recommendations by the DEA.
If the FDA does not use the veto power, the DEA proceeds with the scheduling recommendation. See JAMES T. O'REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL,
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 24:7 (4th ed. 2019).
16. By "split enforcement" model, I am referring to a term used by Lars
Noah to describe the dividing of powers between the FDA and the DEA
under the CSA. Noah, supra note 13.
17. The primary statute referenced here is the Controlled Substances
Act. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). The
subsequent Amendments to the Act are also referenced. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1974), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/
21cfr/21usc/index.html to view each section of the Act and any Amendments since its enactment.
18. For example, if the FDA has not already approved a drug that the
DEA wishes to place on Schedule I, the FDA often defers to the DEA's wishes
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preference for a health-oriented approach begs the question:
Why continue to give such regulatory powers to the DEA and
not a public health agency like the FDA?
While such transfer of regulatory powers may seem radical, it becomes less so after an analysis of some often-forgotten
FDA history. For at least 20 years prior to the DEA's creation,
the FDA regulated and enforced the regulations of illicit sales
19
of non-narcotic drugs, like barbiturates and amphetamines.
In 1966, Congress formalized these enforcement powers by
creating the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control ("BDAC") within
the FDA.20 However, the BDAC was transferred out of the FDA
just two short years later.2 ' It was merged with the FBN and

by following their scheduling recommendations. Noah, supra note 13, at 61.
Further, the DEA's desire to prosecute drug dealers or persons addicted to
the drugs may encourage the agency to label a substance as Schedule I or
Schedule II; had the FDA been charged with the determination of scheduling, the priority may instead focus on "the development of a drug potentially
valuable in treatment of a legitimate class of users." Id. at 61. As such, the
differences in agency expertise affect decision-making regarding the scheduling of substances. See id. at 60. For example, as Lars Noah notes, the DEA
makes many of its scheduling decisions based on the reputation of the active
ingredients, without considering how product formulation and dosage affect
the risks and benefits of the active ingredient to the user. Id. at 61. On the
other hand, the FDA commonly considers nuances, like differences in dosage or product formulation, when reviewing new drug applications. Id. at
61-62. The DEA's current regulations on drug distribution are based on the
drug's schedule without a consideration of the differences between the
drugs within a scheduling class, nor do they consider the different "abuse"
potential based on the route administration or the particular formulation of
the drugs. Id. at 61-63. Yet, dosage and product formulation can play a big
part in the degree to which a substance is potentially-addictive. See generally

id. at 60-62.
19. KATHLEEN J. FRYDL, THE DRUG WARS IN AMERICA,

1940-1973 159-65

(Cambridge University Press 2013).
20. See Interview with Alfred Barnard, HISTORY OF THE U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., at 17-18 [hereinafter Barnard] (May 14, 1987; June 4, 1987; Mar. 2,
1989), https://www.fda.gov/media/81570/download (discussing when and
how he became the Deputy Director of BDAC).
21. John P. Swann, The FDA and the Practice of Pharmacy:PrescriptionDrug
Regulation Before 1968, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF PoIcY
AND PRACTICE 145, 166; see also Interview with Paul A. Pumpian, HISTORY OF
THE U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., at 26 (Jan. 22, 1996), https://www.fda.gov/
media/81369/download [hereinafter Pumpian].
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then moved to the DOJ.22 It later became the agency we now
know as the DEA.2 3

To some, the BDAC's short-lived existence might suggest
that Congress perceived the FDA's enforcement efforts as a
failure. Others may correctly point out that FDA Commissioners were eager to get rid of the BDAC when given the opportunity to do so. 24 Why should Congress consider transferring exclusive powers to regulate controlled substances to the FDA, if
previous FDA Commissioners lobbied to rid the agency of
these powers decades ago?
Building a case for the transfer of regulatory powers from
the DEA to the FDA is a subject worthy of a book-length manuscript, but an apt starting point is to gain a deeper understanding of how the DEA, instead of the FDA, ended up with the
primary powers to regulate and enforce the regulations on potentially-addictive substances. While other scholars have described the circumstances surrounding this assignment of powers to the DEA, 25 this article extends their research and makes
new findings about the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the BDAC, and its power to regulate, to the DEA. Using
oral history testimonies from FDA investigators and administrative officials, this Article adds to the historic literature on
the allocation of regulatory and enforcement powers over potentially-addictive substances. In doing so, this Article provides

22. Notably, some officers within the FDA were relieved when the BDAC
was ultimately transferred to the DOJ. Interview with Herbert L. Ley, HisTORY OF TI-IE U.S. Foon & DRUG ADMIN., at 6 (Dec. 15, 1999), https://www
.fda.gov/media/80939/download ("I always felt uncomfortable in dealing
with BDAC.") [hereinafter Ley]. See also Interview with James W. Swanson,
HisTORY OF THE U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADM[N., at 55 (June 21-23, 1988), https:/
/www.fda.gov/media/81228/download ("It was a relief for most of us who
really didn't like to do that kind of work ... we were very, very pleased to see
it go off in a different direction.") [hereinafter Swanson].
23. The Early Years, DRUG ENF'T ADMIN. 12, 26-29, https://www.dea.gov/
sites/default/files/2018-05/Early%20Years%20p%2012-29.pdf. While Nixon
may be credited with the DEA's creation, legislators and bureaucrats debated for at least a decade as to which agency should regulate potentiallyaddictive substances. Consequently, the creation of the DEA likely stemmed
from recommendations made by commissions during the Kennedy presidency's early years. FRYDi, supra note 19, at 363, n. 212.
24. See Pumpian, supra note 21, at 25, 27; Ley, supra note 22; Swanson,
supra note 22.
25. See, e.g., FRYDi., sup-a note 19; see also Swann, supra note 21, at 166.
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evidence in support of a contemporary transfer of regulatory
power from the DEA to the FDA.
The primary contribution of this Article is that it demonstrates that the removal of the BDAC from the FDA was not
due to the BDAC's poor performance or its more regulatory
approach to enforcement, but rather in large part due to FBN
infiltration into the BDAC and the corruption and criminal
justice approach that accompanied the FBN influence. This
Article contributes to available literature by emphasizing that
the reasons often cited to explain the FDA's short-lived control
of the powers over non-narcotic, potentially-addictive drugs
are incomplete26 and that the BDAC's transfer should not be
used to argue against the re-assignment of such powers today.
This Article begins by introducing the history of the FBN
in an effort to demonstrate how the criminal justice approach
was institutionalized within this influential agency. The FBN's
approach to its enforcement activities is then contrasted with
that of the FDA's field investigators, who paved the way for the
creation of the BDAC years later. Section III chronicles the
rise and fall of the BDAC based on the accounts of former
FDA officials. Section IV concludes with an analysis of why the
DEA was ultimately awarded with jurisdiction over the manufacture and distribution of potentially-addictive substances.
I.
FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT

A.

PRE-BDAC

The FBN and Narcotics Regulation

In 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act ("Harrison Tax
Act") was enacted by Congress to regulate the sale and distribution of opiates.2 7 Upon its passage, the Harrison Tax Act
was viewed by the medical industry as a tax measure designed
to create a recordkeeping and licensing system that accounted
for the dispensing of narcotic medications.2 8 The Harrison
26. See discussion infra Section III.A.
27. Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
28. Rufus G. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: jailing the
Healers and the Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736, 737 (1953). Those in the medical indus-

try actively lobbied, forming the National Drug Trade Conference
("NDTC") to lobby for federal legislation. In doing so, drug manufacturers,
physicians, and pharmacists were all active participants in the defining of the
drug problems during the time. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE:
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Tax Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' power to tax and
spend,29 so the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") 3 0 , a tax
agency and not a public health agency, was assigned to enforce
the law. Responsibilities for enforcement were first given to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and then to the Narcotics Division, which was not created until 1921.31 While a

health agency may have been better equipped to enforce the
Harrison Tax Act, giving such powers to the nation's public
health agency, the Public Health Service, 3 2 could have undermined Congress' reliance on the power to tax and spend if the
Harrison Tax Act were to be challenged as an unconstitutional
exercise of federal power. Moreover, although the Bureau of
Chemistry (the predecessor to the FDA) was in existence, its
regulation of drugs was in its nascent phase.3 3
In sum, while the placement of the regulation of narcotics
within a tax agency seems unusual, the BIR was arguably the
most logical choice to enforce the Harrison Tax Act. Moreover, Congress' decision to award such powers to the BIR over
health agencies was likely not motivated by any consideration
of the merits of such agencies' health approach to addressing
narcotics use. The decision to appoint the BIR was, instead,
motivated by constitutional considerations regarding the separation of powers, and the resulting criminal justice approach
that developed due to the BIR's enforcement was an unplanned consequence of such appointment. In fact, the institutionalization of the criminal justice approach that began with the
BIR's enforcement of the Harrison Tax Act did not come to

ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC

CONTROL 54-55 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed. 1999)

&

(1973); see also El-Sabawi, supra note 8, at 1389-401. The Harrison Tax Act
was also a response to national and international concern over the import
and export of narcotics. See David F. Musto, Opium, Cocaine and Marijuana in
American History, 265 Sci. Am. 40, 43-44 (1991).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
30. The BIR is the predecessor to the Internal Revenue Service.
31. Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, § 10, 38 Stat. 785, 789 (1914).
32. In 1912, the nation's public health agency was the Public Health Service ("PHS"). History, U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., https://www.usphs.gov/
aboutus/history.aspx (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
33. Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, U.S. Foon
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving-regulatory-powers/part-i-1906-food-and-drugs-act-and-its-enforcement
(last updated Apr.

24, 2019).
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fruition until the BIR was charged with policing the prohibited
34
the sale of alcohol during the prohibition era.
The nation's prohibition laws-which outlawed the sale of
alcohol-were also enacted pursuant to Congress' constitutional power to tax and spend3 5 and the nation's tax agency,
the BIR, was therefore tasked with the enforcement of prohibi36
tion laws, along with the Harrison Tax Act. The BIR's Bureau
3 7 was notorious for reinforcing the Temperance
of Prohibition
Movement's narrative of deviancy and for capitalizing on a culture of fear.3 8 In 1927, the BIR transferred the Narcotics Division into the Bureau of Prohibition,3 9 further linking the two
divisions. The same tactics that were used by its new parent
agency in its enforcement of the prohibition laws were
adopted by the Narcotics Division in its enforcement of narcotWAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE
212-13 (2015).
35. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919). Of
note, is the fact that "[p]rohibition was implemented through the taxing
power of the federal government." MusTO, supra note 28, at 46.
36. National Prohibition Act § 5.
37. When the National Prohibition Act passed, a new branch of the BIR
was formed. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BUREAU OF PROHIBITION: ITS
HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 7 (1929). This Prohibition Unit was
initially responsible for the enforcement of Prohibition laws, but it often
passed on enforcement responsibilities to State Prohibition Directors. Id.
The Prohibition Unit, which was originally under the control of the Assistant
Secretary of the Collection of Revenues,was transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Customs, Coast Guard, and Prohibition in 1925. Id. at 9. This shift
was made "out of a desire to obtain better enforcement of the law." Id. at 10.
This shift reorganized the operations of the Prohibition Unit. See id. at
10-13. By 1927, H.R. 10729 became law and the Bureau of Prohibition was
formed within the Treasury Department. Id. at 20. According to the agent
manuals, the Bureau of Prohibition's agents were responsible for "gathering,
correlating, filing, and disseminat.on of information not strictly local in
character, covering violations of the national prohibition act and the related
states [and] to investigate fully all those violations of the national prohibition act and related statutes not specifically entrusted to the several administrators and to the customs force." See Welcome to the Agency, HISTORY OF THE
PROHIBITION BUREAU, https://prohibitionbureauhistory.omeka.net/exhibits/show/the-prohibition-bureau/1920/agency (last visited Aug. 24, 2019).
No changes were made to the Unit until March 3, 1927. SCHMECKEBIER,
supra, at 154.
38. See generally McGiRR, supra note 34.
39. Records of the Drug Enforcement Administration, NAT'L ARCHIVES, https:/
(last vis/www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/170.html
itedJan. 16, 2020).

34. See

LISA

McGIRR,

THE

OF THE AMERICAN STATE
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ics regulations. 4 0 After its merger with the Federal Narcotics
Control Board, the Narcotics Division became its own bureau,
called the Bureau of Narcotics ("FBN"). Despite its transfer,
the FBN continued its use of the Bureau of Prohibition's rhetoric to define a criminal class and to establish the FBN as its
41
police.
The culture of punishment that came to dominate the
FBN, and later the DEA, endured in part because of its longtime leader, HarryJ. Anslinger. President Herbert Hoover appointed HarryJ. Anslinger as Commissioner of the FBN, a position Anslinger held for over three decades. 4 2 Commissioner
Anslinger transferred to the FBN from the Bureau of Prohibition, which was soon to be dissolved due in part to its ineffective enforcement of the nation's prohibition laws. 4 3 Anslinger
was intent on preventing the FBN from succumbing to the
same fate as the Bureau of Prohibition and spent much of his
career convincing legislators, bureaucrats, and the public that
narcotics and marijuana were a threat to public safety, that
these drugs should be feared, and that the FBN could protect
the nation from their perils." As historian Lisa McGirr describes, "A stalwart supporter of the antiliquor crusade, Anslinger brought its moral fervor and Manichaean outlook to
his new mission.. . . [A]t the helm of the new Federal Bureau
of Narcotics Anslinger applied this same harsh treatment to
drug violators more successfully, urging judges to 'jail offenders, then throw away the keys.'" 4 5 Throughout his tenure, Anslinger's rhetoric laid the foundation for the FBN's criminal
40. Id.
41. As Rufus G. King notes, the courts helped aid the Narcotics Bureau,
and its predecessor the Narcotics Division, in this criminal justice interpretation. King, supra note 28, at 738.
42. The Early Years, supra note 23, at 16.
43. Rebecca Carroll, Under the Influence: Harry Anslinger's Role in Shaping
America's Drug Policy, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY
AND PRAcHrICE

61, 61 (onathon

Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., Pharm.

Prods. Press 2004); see also Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and
State Control over IntoxicatingLiquor: Accommodating the FederalInterest, 79 CAL.

L. REv. 161, 179 (1991).
44. Much has been written about Anslinger's strategic and rhetorical

See, e.g., DouGLAs VALENTINE, THE STRENGTH OF THE Wote: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS 50-65 (2004); Carroll, supra note 43,
at 66; PEMBLETON, supra note 3.
skills.

45. McGIRR, supra note 34, at 217.
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justice approach by characterizing those addicted to narcotics
4
and those who sold narcotics as "deviants."

6

The culture that Anslinger created within the FBN would
have such a lasting effect that decades later, it influenced how
47
DEA agents would come to define their primary duties. As a
consequence of Anslinger's branding of the FBN as a criminal
justice agency, the FBN neglected its duties of enforcement
and monitoring of the dispensing of potentially-addictive
pharmaceutical narcotics. 4 8 Rather than devoting resources to
the oversight of manufacturers, distributors, and providers of
pharmaceutical narcotics, the FBN chose to focus its resources
on headline-worthy drug busts involving international crime
rings.49 When the nation was faced with new synthetic drug
problems caused by non-narcotic, potentially-addictive substances that had medical use,5 0 the FBN steadfastly argued that
its primary purpose was to target criminal enterprises and not
5
to police the misuse of otherwise licit substances. ' Commis-

sioner Anslinger repeatedly urged Congress to delegate the
regulation of potentially-addictive, non-narcotic pharmaceuti-2
5
cal substances, like barbiturates, to another federal agency.

46. See EDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VIcTIMs 138-45 (1965) (providing an in-depth discussion of the social and policy ramifications of categorizing drug users as deviants); see also MERRILL SINGER &J. BRYAN PAGE, THE
SOCIAL VALUE OF DRUG ADDICTS: THE USES OF THE USELESS 159-69 (2014).
Much of Anslinger's negative depiction of drug users was racially charged.
See Douglas A. Berman, Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement
Practices, 30 FED. SENT'G REp., no. 4-5, Apr./June 2018, at 231, 305-16

(2018).
47. See

PEMBLETON,

Q. WILSON, THE
22, 42 (1978)).

supra note 3, at 112 (citing JAMES

FBI AND NARCOTIcS
48. FRYDL, supra note 19, at 282.

INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING

AGENTS

&

49. Id.
50. For an overview of the growth of amphetamine use, see UELMEN
H-ADDOx, supra note 12, § 3:39. For a discussion on steroids, see id. § 3:148.
For a discussion of hallucinogens, see id. § 3:104; see also PEMBLETON, Supra
note 3, at 278-79.
51. See generally LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 1, 3-5

(2014).
52. For example, when testifying in front of Congress in 1955 on Traffic
in, and Control of, Narcotics, Barbiturates, and Amphetamines, Anslinger
explicitly stated that he did not believe that barbiturates should be handled
by the Treasury Department and that there was a "tremendous difference"
between heroin addicts and persons who use barbiturates. Traffic in, and Control of Narcotics, Barbiturates, and Amphetamines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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As historian Matthew Pembleton notes, "the FBN had important regulatory functions, but it was first and foremost a police
agency, and that, too, shaped how it saw the drug problem. In
short, the FBN was a hammer, so everything looked like a

nail. "5
While the true reasons for the FBN's staunch refusal to
accept responsibility for the regulation and enforcement of
potentially-addictive, non-narcotic substances are debatable,
some scholars suggest that Anslinger refused to take on these
new drugs because of his close relationships with the pharmaceutical companies that manufactured them.5 4
B.

FDA and the Regulation of Other Potentially-AddictiveDrugs

For nearly two decades, Congress continued debating
over which agency should be tasked with the oversight of new
potentially-addictive, non-narcotic substances.5 5 Some legislators argued that it was duplicative to create another government agency to oversee the regulation of potentially-addictive,
non-narcotic substances when the FBN was already responsible
for the regulation of narcotics. 5 6 But Anslinger and the FBN

were powerful forces with which to reckon, and so the regulation of these new synthetic, potentially-addictive drugs remained unassigned. 5 7
FDA investigators stepped in to fill the void, going undercover to investigate the illicit distribution of stimulants, amphetamines, and barbiturates, among other "dangerous
drugs."5 Unlike the FBN, the FDA began as an agriculture diNarcotics of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 84th Cong. 1114 (1955) (statement of Harry Anslinger, Commissioner, Bureau of Narcotics); see also
FRYDL, supra note 19, at 166.
53. PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 33.
54. See, e.g., id. at 278.
55. FRYDLt,, supra note 19, at 271-88.
56. See generally SAcCo, supra note 51; see also FRYDi., supra note 19, at 159.
57. FRYDL, supra note 19, at 159
58. Interview with Henry P. Roberts, Former Director, Food & Drug Admin., at 14 (June 20, 2006), https://www.fda.gov/media/81593/download;
Interview with Charles W. (Bill) Sedgwick, Former Director, Food & Drug
Admin., at 20 (June 21, 2006), https://www.fda.gov/media/86282/
download; see also Swanson, supra note 22, at 54; Interview with Alfred Barnard, Director, Bureau of Reg. Compliance, Food & Drug Admin., at 50
(May 14, 1987; June 4, 1987; Mar. 2, 1989), https://www.fda.gov/media/
81570/download [hereinafter Barnard].
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vision within the U.S. Patent Office in 1847; after a number of
name changes and administrative shuffles, it became the Food
and Drug Administration in 1930.5 The FDA was created as a
public health agency charged with ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs.6 0 While the FDA had been granted the powers
to regulate food and drugs incrementally prior to 1938,61 the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic ("FDC") Act of 1938, and
its amendments, are largely cited as the source of the FDA's
modern powers to regulate drugs. 62
The FDA first began regulating potentially-addictive, nonnarcotic drugs, including amphetamines, barbiturates, and
sulfa drugs under the FDC. 63 The FDC required that drugs
carry labels that notified consumers that they were safe for
59. In 1890, the agency was named the Division of Chemistry. It was
changed again in 1901 to the Bureau of Chemistry. Soon after, in 1927, the
name was again changed to the United States Food, Drug and Insecticide
Administration. Three years later, the name was shortened to its current
name, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Of note, the FDA was originally housed in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, but, in 1940, the FDA
was transferred to the Federal Security Agency, a newly formed agency. In
1953, the agency was renamed to the Department of Health Education and
Welfare and then in 1979, the Department of Health and Human Services.
See History of FDA's Internal Organization, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 31,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/history-fdas-fight-consumer-protection-and-public-health/history-fdas-internal-organization.
60. See generally Oxycontin and Beyond, supra note 14.

61. In 1848, Congress passed the Drug Importation Act, which required
U.S. Customs Service to conduct inspections drugs imported into the United
States. From 1880 to 1905, more than one-hundred food and drug bills were
introduced to Congress. By 1906, the first ever Food and Drug Act passed,
prohibiting interstate commerce of both adulterated and misbranded foods,
drinks, and drugs. A seminal Supreme Court, U.S. v. Johnson was decided in
1911, determining that the 1906 Act only prohibited misleading and false
statement about the identity or the ingredients of a drug. In response, Congress enacted the Sherley Amendment in 1912 to prohibit the labeling of
medicines with false therapeutic claims. Ultimately, by 1933, the FDA recommended that the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 be completely revised, a battle
lasting five years to implement. Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving(last updated
regulatory-powers/milestones-us-food-and-drug-law-history
Jan. 31, 2018).
62. O'REiLLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 15, at 3.
63. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); see
also John P. Swann, Drug Abuse Control Under IDA, 1938-1968, 112 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 83, 83 (1997) (discussing how the 1938 regulations "stipulated
that certain drugs . . . had such a potential for misuse or abuse that they
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use. 6 4 The FDA determined that due to their potential for misuse, amphetamines, barbiturates and sulfa drugs could not be
labeled as safe for use when self-medicating. 65 Rather, they
could only be safely used under the management of a physician or dentist. 6 6 This distinction between self-medication and

physician management was the first differentiation between
over-the-counter ("OTC") and prescription medication.6 7
Beginning in the late 1930s, the FDA began to enforce
this interpretation of the FDC by investigating illegal OTC
sales of medication that should otherwise have only been dispensed with a prescription. 68 This enforcement accelerated after the Supreme Court confirmed FDA jurisdiction over retail
pharmacies in 1948.69 FDA investigators were responsible for
the conviction of more than 2,300 persons and firms for illicit
drug sales from the 1950s to the mid-1960s. 7 0 The investigators' work was described by some FDA personnel as "criminal
work," even though field investigators may not have perceived
it as such. 7 ' One common example of such work is what is referred to as "truck stop work." 7 2 Truck stop work required FDA
simply could not be labeled safe self-medication."). As such, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951 was enacted. Id.

64. See 52 Stat. 1040.
65. Swann, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Id. The distinction between prescription and over the counter use
was further reinforced by the Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951. Id.
68. See John P. Swann, The FDA and the Practice of Pharmacy: Prescription
Drug Regulation Before 1968, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EvoLUTION OF
POIICY AND PRACTICE 145, 155 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds.,
Pharm. Prods. Press 2004). See also Interview with Edward Wilkens for first
hand discussion of a FDA investigators' experience with this, in 1958, HisTORY OF THE FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at 28-40 (Apr. 20, 2004), https://www
.fda.gov/media/80970/download [hereinafter Wilkens].

69. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (holding that the FDA
also had jurisdiction over pharmacies, allowing the agency to investigate the
illegal sales of pharmaceutical drugs-including amphetamines and barbiturates-occurring in pharmacies); see also Swann, supra note 68 at 158.
70. Swann, supra note 63, at 84.
71. See Wilkens, supra note 68, at 81; see also Interview with James Ritz,
HISTORY OF THE U.S. Fool
& DRUG ADMIN., at 28 (May 9, 2001), https://
www.fda.gov/media/81584/download ("Of course, there were always people
in FDA doing criminal work.").
72. See FRYDi, supra note 19, at 192-98; see also Wilkens, supra note 68, at
37-41 (describing the illicit trafficking of pharmaceutical amphetamines at
truck stops).
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field investigators to go undercover to attempt to purchase
prescription drugs without a prescription.7 3 As one FDA investigator describes, "I found myself working all day making inspections of oil mills and warehouses and cornmeal plants,
and then working half the night trying to make illegal drug
buys from pharmacies and truck stops and individual operators."

74

With only 200 investigators to oversee transactions at
50,000 retail drug stores, however, the FDA was understaffed
to properly investigate illicit pharmaceutical sales amidst the
growing drug crisis. 7 5 FDA investigators used evidence ob-

,

tained during their fieldwork to demonstrate to Congress the
scope of the nation's drug problem, while demonstrating their
76
capabilities for enforcement despite their limited resources.
While FDA investigators and their unit supervisors may have
wanted Congress to formalize their investigations in a legislative delegation of enforcement powers, the FDA Commissioner Paul Dunbar (1944-1951) did not want the responsibility of policing the illicit traffic of amphetamines and barbiturates.7 7 His field investigators had been policing the illicit
distribution of non-narcotic drugs for nearly three decades 7 8
but the FDA's field investigators would not have a legislative
advocate until his successor, George Larrick (1954-1965), was
appointed as FDA Commissioner. 7 9 While FDA investigators
were increasing their enforcement activity, the FBN was experiencing turmoil.8 0 The discord at the FBN combined with the

FDA's enforcement activity paved the way for the creation of
the BDAC within the FDA.

73. See FRYDL, supra note 19, at 192-98.
74. Swanson, supra note 22, at 28.
75. Swann, supra note 68 at 160.
76. See Swanson, supra note 22, at 40-41.
77. See FRYDL, supra note 19, at 166-67.
78. Swann, supra note 68 at 155.
79. Commissioner Larrick lobbied for the assignment of criminal powers
to the FDA, as well as the rights to asset forfeiture. See FRYDL, supra note 19,
at 271.
80. Wilkens, supra note 68, at 66.
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II.
THE RISE

&

FALL OF THE

BDAC

A.
The Creation of the BDAC
In the early 1960s, Henry Anslinger reached his
mandatory retirement age and reluctantly retired."' Anslinger's successor was not well-equipped to handle the changing public opinion on drug use accompanying the cultural
changes occurring during the 1960s, nor did he have "the
force of personality nor the political acumen necessary to corral the rambunctious agency and guide it through its many crises." 8 2 Moreover, national attention shifted to concerns about
the recreational use of non-narcotic drugs, like LSD, barbiturates, and amphetamines: drugs outside the jurisdiction of the
FBN. 8 3 The FBN continued to resist additional enforcement
duties, and its parent agency, the Department of Treasury,8 4
similarly did not want to be associated with this increase in
regulatory power.8 5 Historian Kathleen Frydl argues that the
Department of Treasury was "[b]eset by complaints and challenges to the legitimacy" of its new power to tax the income of
American's absent a war and did not want the additional challenges that might arise with the expansion of its powers to regulate all potentially-addictive substances.8 6
Further, legislators were already inclined to treat amphetamines and barbiturates differently than narcotics because
those addicted to narcotics were portrayed as "inner city
blacks," while other drug users were often described as "white"
and "middle class."8 7 For example, during a hearing before
the Subcommittee on Narcotics, Representative Frank Karsten
explicitly asked Anslinger about these differences by stating,
81. Despite his retirement, Anslinger tried to stay active in American
drug policy, but had limited success in maintaining his influence. See PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 272-95. Some scholars argue that Anslinger was
forced to retire by the Kennedy Administration. See FRYDL, supra note 19, at

243.
82. See PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 273.
83. See Swann, supra note 63, at 85.
84. See DrugEnforcement Agency History: The Early Years, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-05/Early%2OYears%20p

%2012-29.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
85. PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 273.
86. FRYD, supra note 19, at 159.

87. Id. at 158.
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"[t] here would be a great difference between a man who has
been taking two sleeping pills every night for 15 years, and a
88
heroin addict. There is a great difference in the two?" To
that, Anslinger replied, "[t] here would be a tremendous differ-

ence."8 9
Congress' willingness to differentiate between narcotic
and non-narcotic use was complemented by support from the
1963 President's Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug
Abuse. The Commission reported on the FDA's accomplishments, despite their meager resources, and suggested that the
FDA receive additional appropriations to continue its fight
against the illicit sales of potentially-addictive non-narcotic
drugs.90 The FDA's fieldwork, combined with the FBN's refusal to accept new responsibilities, led to the enactment of
the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965.91 The purpose
of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments was to protect "the
public health and safety by amending the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act to establish special controls for depressant
and stimulant drugs and counterfeit drugs."9 2 Under the Drug
Abuse Control Amendments, a new division was created within
the FDA: the BDAC. 93 While FDA field investigators of illicit
OTC sales had already assumed responsibility for the control
94
of the distribution of non-narcotic drugs, the creation of the
BDAC legitimized their operations and granted them new
powers. The BDAC was awarded the power to regulate all potentially-addictive, non-narcotic drugs and was given addi95
tional appropriations, offices, and investigators. The BDAC
officers were also permitted to carry firearms, make arrests,

88. Statement of Harry Anslinger, supra note 52.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See Swann, supra note 63, at 84.
91. See Interview with Maurice D. Kinslow, HISTORY OF THE FOOD AND
DRUG ADM[N., at 11-13 (Sept. 16, 18, 1982), https://www.fda.gov/media/
81024/download [hereinafter Kinslow]. Drug Abuse Control Amendments

of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226 (1965).
92. Id. at 227.
93. SeeJoseph D Lohman & Robert M. Carter, University TrainingProgram

for Agents of the Bureau of Drug Abuse Contro4 57 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
526, 526-27 (1967).
94. See Wilkens, supra note 68, at 28-29.
95. Swann, supra note 63, at 85.
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and serve search warrants, powers normally reserved for criminal enforcement agencies.9 6
FDA investigators with field experience investigating OTC
sales were sent to Berkeley, California to take courses on criminal investigation. 7 Because this was the FDA's first assignment
of criminal powers", FDA officials turned to FBN officials for
guidance. The BDAC also recruited law enforcement officers,
including those from the FBN, to join their ranks.9 9 Unbeknownst to FDA officials, however, many of the FBN agents
that applied to transfer to the BDAC were under investigation
for corruption. 100 The FBN, eager to get rid of its "unattractive
people," withheld evidence of the agents' corruption from the
BDAC officials.' 0' Many of these FBN agents were hired by the
BDAC with promotion and some entered into leadership positions. 102
Despite seeking law enforcement expertise by consulting
with the FBN, in 1966, the FDA appointed John Finlater as
director. Finlater was an experienced manager who did not
have a law enforcement background.1 0 3 He hoped to bring a
fresh approach to enforcement, one that was more aligned
with the purpose of protecting public health.1 0 4 He defined
his approach as a "statistical-psychological-educational" approach that did not center around the deviancy of the drug
user. 1 5 It also emphasized collaboration with state and local
law enforcement, 0 6 a feature that was more typical of the regulatory approach used by the FDA's pre-BDAC field investiga96.

Id.

97. Wilkens, supra note 68, at 42-43.
98. Some FDA investigators felt that these criminal enforcement powers
were much needed due to the dangers encountered during their investigations. See e.g. Swanson, supra note 22, at 31.
99. Id. at 43; see also PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 280.

100. Wilkens, supra note 68, at 66-67; see also Interview with Francis J. Flaherty, HISTORY OF THE U.S. Foon & DRUG ADMIN., at 8 (June 14, 2000),
https://www.fda.gov/media/81557/download [hereinafter Flaherty].
101. Flaherty, supra note 100; see also Wilkens, supra note 68, at 61-62.
102. See Flaherty, supra note 100.
103. Pumpian, supra note 21, at 27.
104. Finlater's approach also focused on drug traffickers' behavior rather
than punishing the drug users. PEMBLETON, sup-a note 3, at 280; see also VAiENTINE, supra note 44, at 381.
105. PEMBIETON, supra note 3, at 280.
106. Id.; see also VALENTINE, supra note 44, at 381.
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Finlater's approach included addressing the demand

for drugs, alongside the supply. Alfred Barnard, the former
Deputy Director of the BDAC, who had been recruited to assist
Finlater form the agency, created a Division of Drug Studies
and Statistics to explore the factors that led to the demand for
drugs.10 8 "I was more interested in really looking into the basic
problems that lead to drug abuse as opposed to just making
cases and putting peddlers in jail,"' 0 9 Barnard explained.
B.

The Unraveling of the BDAC

While this new approach was complementary to the regulatory approach used by FDA-turned-BDAC-investigators
("FDAers"), it clashed with the former FBN officers' punitive
approach. 110 While the FDAers were much more focused on
protocols, processes, and procedures (a regulatory approach
to enforcement), former FBN officers were more likely to ignore protocol, engage in entrapment, or otherwise take ethi1
cally questionable shortcuts to accomplish their objects."
This behavior may have been encouraged while these officers
were at the FBN through the implementation of arrest quotas,
which required FBN officers to reach a minimum number of
arrests within a specified time period.11 2 The pressure to meet
these quotas helped create an FBN culture that played fast and
loose with the rules, and while no such quota system existed at
the BDAC, the FBN's culture was still embedded in the practices of the former FBN officers, 1 13 as was the rowdiness and,
corruption that accompanied them.1 14 As a former Director of
Product Surveillance and Approval of the New Jersey District
recounts:
[T]hey may not have been taking bribes, but like I
said, they were entrapping people, they were probably taking some money. You know, they'd bust into a
place to arrest people, and there'd be a thousand,

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Pumpian, supra note 21, at 41.
Barnard, supra note 20, at 62.
Id.
See FRYDL, supra note 19, at 171.
See Wilkens, supra note 68, at 56-60.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 55-57.
Id. at 69. ("[T]hey were a wild bunch, a real wild bunch.").
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$100,000 laying around on the bed." 5 . . . [T]hey
used to tell us stories, and they'd tell us stories out of
the BDAC class, the federal guys, where they'd break
into these places and find these huge amounts of
money and huge amounts of drugs there. And when
you see, especially with the city guys were getting paid
like $20,000 a year or something, and they'd go in
and there's tons of money laying around, so they
were really exposed to the biggest temptation you
can imagine, and it's hard to pass up. Nobody knew
how much money was there. You know, they could
grab a bundle of it and nobody would know, and they
did; a lot of them did."r 6
The former FBN officers' behaviors made the FDAers uncomfortable." 7 As the former Director of the Bureau of Regulatory Compliance recalled, "Initially, we had a pretty good operation. When they went into Narco, it became a different situ-

ation."1 18

As more FBN officers began migrating from the struggling FBN to the BDAC, the FDA's culture of regulatory enforcement became overshadowed by the FBN's culture.' 1 9 Despite poor reputations with U.S. Attorney's Office and FDA investigators, the former FBN officers touted their experience
and took over the ranks of the BDAC.120 "These Bureau of
Narcotics guys, who knew nothing about FDA or nothing
about our cases, were in charge," explained a former Chief
Agent of the New York Field Office.12
As the former FBN officers grew in number, many FDAers
requested transfers and left the BDAC.1 22 While these FDAers
had liked-even loved-the work that they were doing, they
115. Id.

at

68.

116. Id. at 69.
117. See id. at 60-61. "He had all these diamond rings on, you know, like
you see in the movies. Where did all these diamond rings, diamond pins,
where do these guys get their money, you know?" Id. at 61.
118. Barnard, supra note 20, at 18.
119. "[T]hey kind of took over this FDA bureau." Flaherty, supra note 100,
at 9.
120. See Wilkens, supra note 68, at 62.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 64-66; see also Flaherty, supra note 100; Barnard, supra note 20;
Pumpian, supra note 21.
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found the new environment untenable. 2 3 As the Chief Agent
of the New York Field Office later testified:
Anyway, it was a disappointment, the agency, to me,
the 18 months or whatever I was in there, because it
wasn't, in my mind, an FDA type agency. We were
overwhelmed, overtaken at the headquarters level
and the field level and the agent level with these
other people with different standards, different ways
of operating. Not that that was bad, but different
credibility, different ethics, and it was more than I
could handle. So I'm so lucky that I got out of there
with a promotion. I mean, if I got out of there later24
ally, I would have been happy.1
In 1968, only two short years after its creation, the BDAC
was transferred out of the FDA and with it went the FDA's status as the primary enforcer of regulations on potentially-addictive, non-narcotic substances.1 25 President Johnson merged
26
the BDAC with the FBN through an executive order 2 7at the
Torecommendation of FDA Commissioner Goddard.'
gether, the agencies were transferred to the DOJ, forming the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ("BNDD").

28

FBN

leadership was not happy about the merger, as its Director
considered it a decrease in stature, 1 29 and Congress was split
over whether to support or override the President's merger
plan. 3 0 Representative Thomas Hale Boggs, an ally of the FBN
Commissioner, proposed a resolution to override the Presi123. Wilkens, supra note 68, at 66.
124. Id. at 70-71.
125. See Swann, supra note 63, at 86.
126. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, reprinted in 82 Stat. 1367, 1368
(1968).
127. Goddard had been informed by the FDA's Director of the Office of
Legislative and Governmental Affairs that President Kennedy's White House
Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse had recommended that the BDAC
be transferred to the DOJ. Because Goddard wanted to get rid of the BDAC,
he used the information to support his request for its transfer. See Pumpian,
supra note 21, at 25.
128. Id.; see also DRUG ENF'T ADmIN., THE DEA YEARs 30, 30 (2018), https:/
0
/www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2 18-07/1970-1975%20p%2030-39.pdf.
129. Pumpian, supra note 21, at 27.
130. Id. at 28. As Pumpian explained, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Narcotics worked together with Representative Thomas Hale Boggs to attempt to block the merger. Id. at 27-28.
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dent's reorganization order, which was defeated by only ten
votes. 13 ' Legislators voiced skepticism over whether the DOJ
was equipped to handle licit regulation, with some wondering
if the merger was "an overreaction to crime in the streets, an
enforcement kind of attitude." 3 2 After the merger, attempts
were made to preserve some of the FDAers' regulatory approach by appointing former BDAC Director, John Finlater, as
an associate director of the BNDD.' 3" However, after John Ingersoll, a former street cop, was named as director of BNDD,
the BNDD's adoption of a criminal justice approach, over a
regulatory approach, was imminent.1 3 4
In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970'13 to address "[t] he

illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession
and improper use of controlled substances."' 3 6 Title II of the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") created a scheduling system to classify controlled substances,13 7 based on the level of
dangerousness, their potential for addiction, and their "legitimate medical value."' 3 8 Upon enactment, the CSA was enforced by BNDD.1 3 9 Although Congress provided some guidance on the scheduling scheme in CSA, it also "insisted that
the Attorney General request and abide by recommendations
from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
when revising the schedule."1 40 Theoretically, this was Con131. Id. at 27-29. Frydl suggests that
could have been attributed to backlash
ment a few days earlier that he would
supra note 19, at 285.
132. Id. at 287 (citing JOHN FINIATER,
STORY 22 (New York: Simon & Schuster,

the near-passage of the resolution
of President Johnson's announcenot be seeking re-election. FRvD,
THE DRUGGED NATION: A "NARc's"

1973)).

133. Henry L. Giordano, a commissioner of the FBN, was appointed as the

co-associate director with Finlater. Each co-associate director believed that
he would be later selected to act as sole director, but neither co-associate
director was selected to be director. DOUGIAs VALENTINE, STRENGTH OF THE
PACK: THE PERSONALITIES, PoInS AND ESPIONAGE INTRIGUES THAT SHAPED
THE DEA 2-5 (2009).
134. Pumpian, supra note 21, at 29.

135. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (1970).
137. THE DEA YEARS, supra note 128, at 31.

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Noah, supra note 13, at 58.
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gress' attempt to balance a criminal justice approach with a
more-scientific health approach. 14 1 Yet, the powers delegated
to the FDA, vis-A-vis HHS, paled in comparison to those given
to the BNDD.1 42 This imbalance of power was later compounded by President Nixon's creation of his own "police
force," the DEA. 143
The BNDD was subsumed into the DEA in June of
1973.144 Nixon's election platform included the promise to
strengthen federal enforcement of laws regulating illicit drug
trafficking, and the DEA was the vehicle through which Nixon
1 4 5 While a
planned to accomplish this campaign promise.
more health-oriented treatment approach had gained support
during the late 1960s and early 1970s within the Executive
branch,1 46 the creation of the DEA symbolized a "choice in
47
favor of enforcement, and exclusively enforcement."1 By creating the DEA and awarding it with primary jurisdiction over
potentially-addictive substances, the President endorsed and
institutionalized the FBN's criminal justice approach over the
FDA's regulatory, health-oriented approach.

141. Congress requires the DEA to request recommendations from the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) when
scheduling potentially-addictive substances. The Secretary of the Department of HHS operates through the FDA's Center for Drugs and with advice
from the FDA Drug Abuse Advisory Committee. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2018).
Furthermore, the FDA has veto power over the scheduling recommendations made by the DEA. If the FDA does not use the veto power, the DEA
proceeds with the scheduling recommendation. O'REiLLY & VAN TASSEL,

supra note 15; 21 C.F.R. § 14.100(c) (6) (2019).
142. Compare THE DEA YEARs, supra note 128, at 30-34 (discussing BNDD
authority and power in the early 1970s), with discussion supra note 141 (explaining the role of the HHS).
143. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER

IN AMERICA 216 (Verso 1990) ("The White House finally succeeded in 1972
in creating a private police force in the form of the Office of Drug Abuse
Law Enforcement.").
144. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 1, 87 Stat.
1091 (1973).
145. See FRYDYL, supra note 19, at 363.
146. See MICHAEL MASSING, THE Fix 86 (1998) (discussing Nixon's appointment ofJaffe). As a means to enforce the Controlled Substances Act, in July
of 1973, President Nixon created the DEA. SACCO, supra note 51, at 6-7.
147. FRYDYL, supra note 19, at 364.
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III.
WHY

THE

DEA

AND NOT THE

FDA?

Some scholars have claimed that the BDAC was short lived
because the work it did often overlapped with the FBN.1 48
Many illicit drug traffickers sold narcotics along with other potentially-addictive substances, resulting in the BDAC and the
FBN investigating the same persons.1 49 Scholars have also argued that the BDAC was transferred out of the FDA because
the scope of enforcement necessary to quell the nation's drug
problem was more than the FDA could handle and that the
FDA was ill-equipped to handle responsibilities that were re50
quired to enforce the CSA.o
Their arguments are supported
by the lack of buy-in of FDA leadership evidenced by FDA
Commissioner Goddard's unwillingness to fight to keep the
BDAC.'15 Taken at face value, these arguments beg the question: Why should Congress consider shifting the powers of enforcement from the DEA to the FDA?
The evidence presented in this Article challenges the
aforementioned explanations, by arguing that oral history testimony demonstrates the following key findings. A faction
within the FDA wanted the powers at issue and executed its
duties in a manner that convinced Congress to institutionalize
those duties.1 5 2 When the BDAC was created and the FDA's
jurisdiction was institutionalized, the BDAC continued to perform well, "steali[ing]" headlines from the FBN1'5 and making
"splashy busts."1 54 Given these facts, why would the FDA Commissioner lobby for these powers only to advocate for their reassignment two years later?
Former FDA Commissioner Larrick and his successor, former Commissioner Goddard, reported being uncomfortable
with the riskiness of undercover work.' 5 5 Commissioner Larrick was said to have set up the BDAC as an independent

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See, e.g., id. at 159.
Swann, supra note 68 at 166.
Id. See, e.g., FRYD, supra note 19, at 122.
Swann, supra note 68 at 150.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 280-81.
VALENTINE, supra note 44, at 381.
See Kinslow, supra note 91, at 13-14; Ley, supra note 22, at 6-7.
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Perhaps, Commissioner

Larrick did so because he was aware that the FBN's demise was
forthcoming1 5 8 and that Attorney General Robert Kennedy
5
had expressed interest in absorbing the FBN into the DOJ.1

9

FDA leadership may have also been hesitant to fight to
keep the BDAC because of its high profile clashes with FBN
leadership that generated negative publicity for the FDA. During FDA Commissioner Goddard's tenure, FDA leadership was
under scrutiny for its public disagreement with the FBN over
the harmful effects of marijuana, with FBN officials insisting
on using Prohibition Era rhetoric to describe marijuana use
and the FDA questioning the scientific basis for the FBN's
claims.' 6 0 This disagreement culminated in a call for FDA
Commissioner Goddard to resign over his comments that alco16
hol was likely more harmful than marijuana. 1 The negative
press coverage of the marijuana disagreement was compounded by coverage of birth-defects caused by an FDA-approved drug called thalidomide. The thalidomide tragedy led
to questions of FDA competence in regulating dangerous
drugs.1 6 2 Moreover, the BDAC was not without its own controversy. Commissioner Goddard worried about the "reaction to
agents being killed" and potential damage to the FDA's image
as a "scientific agency."16 3 The Commissioner's concerns were
particularly warranted given the corruption of former FBN ofthe
ficers detailed above. Shortly after the BDAC merged with
64 FBN
FBN, BNDD leadership purged itself of "dirty agents."
officials had been aware of the internal investigations within
the FBN that prompted the transfer of its unsavory agents to
the BDAC, and, once it was merged with the BDAC, these former FBN officials used that information to fire thirty-two
65
agents on suspicions of corruption.1 BNDD leaders then in156. Flaherty, supra note 100, at 7.
157. Swanson, supra note 22; see also Pumpian, supra note 21, at 25.
158. See VALENTINE, supra note 44, at 455-56 (discussing how the FBN was
becoming obsolete).
159. AG Kennedy later changed his mind about wanting the FBN. See
FRYDL, supra note 19, at 264-68.
160. See PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 281-82.
161. Id. at 281.

162.

FRYDL,

sup-a note 19, at 245.

163. Pumpian, sup-a note 21, at 25.
164. PEMBLETON, supra note 3, at 283.
165. Wilkens, supra note 68 at 66-68.
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vited the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct an investigation into the scope of the corruption. 16 6
In sum, the evidence reviewed in this section suggests that
our prior understanding of the circumstances surrounding the
transfer of the BDAC from the FDA to the DOJ are incomplete. The evidence reviewed supplements the historic record
by proving that despite contrary indications by FDA leadership, a faction within the FDA wanted the powers to investigate
illicit sales of potentially-addictive substances. The evidence
presented disputes theories that the FDA lost its position as
primary enforcer because the FDA was ineffective at its duties.
Moreover, this article demonstrates that when the FDA was enforcing the regulations on potentially-addictive substances, it
did so using a regulatory rather than a criminal justice approach-an approach that may be more in-line with current
efforts to utilize a public health approach in addressing problem drug use related to the ongoing opioid crisis. Finally, this
Article provides a new theory to explain how the FDA lost
some of its powers to regulate these potentially-addictive substances to the DEA-one that suggests that the downfall of the
BDAC can be attributed to the willful sabotage by FBN leaders
and accompanied by an infiltration of FBN officers into the
BDAC. It was not that the FDA's regulatory approach was not
the most effective in addressing the illicit sales of potentiallyaddictive substance, but rather that the FBN's criminal justice
approach displaced the FDA's regulatory approach and led to
the demise of the BDAC.
Since Congress has reconsidered the use of the criminal
justice approach to address problem drug use, it should also
revisit its reliance on a criminal justice agency to regulate and
enforce the regulation of potentially-addictive substances. The
FDA has a history of regulating potentially-addictive substances. Even after the powers of enforcement were taken away
from the FDA vis-;i-vis the transfer of the BDAC, the FDA continued to express a desire to at least regulate a facet of illicit

166. Id.
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167. The FDA's efforts to regulate illicit distribution of potentially-addictive drugs resulted in a D.C. court decision maintaining that Congress had
delegated those powers to the DEA. The court concluded that, "Congress
intended to create two complementary institutional checks, [the FDA and
the DEA] on the production and marketing of new drugs." The public policy
arguments made by the FDA to control the distribution of a controlled substance did not outweigh the deliberate Congressional separation of the powers of the DEA and the FDA. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger,
377 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1974).
168. This is not to say that FDA's current reviews of potential risks and
benefits of drugs is not without its flaws. FDA's decision-making process has
been criticized as being too clinical (or individualistic) (see Noah, supra note
13, at 55-74), as needing to include more of a consideration of population
or public health in determining risks and benefits (see, e.g., Micah L.

Berman, Taleed El-Sabawi & Peter G. Shields, Risk Assessment for Tobacco Regu-

lation, 5 TOBAcco REG. Sci. 36, 36-49 (2019)), and as relying too heavily on
placebo-controlled clinical trials (see generally SUZANNE WHITE JUNOD, FDA
AND CLINICAL DRUG TIUALs: A SHORT HisrORY, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/media/110437/download). And, in 2005, the FDA
came under congressional scrutiny for regulation of OxyContin, a potentially-addictive opioid. Oxycontin and Beyond, supra note 14.
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